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A Call for a Harmonized Approach to Agreements to Mediate 
Maryam Salehijam* 
Abstract 
Commercial parties increasingly agree to submit their current or future disputes to mediation 
in an attempt to resolve disagreements in an efficient and amicable manner. Agreements to 
mediate, however, can have opposing affects due to the persisting uncertainty regarding their 
binding nature. There are a growing number of instances in which the parties dispute about 
whether a party may ignore the agreement to mediate and proceed directly to binding 
mechanisms such as arbitration, the content of the obligations therein, as well as the forum 
that may address these legal question. The current risk associated with agreements to mediate 
adversely affects the advancement of mediation as risk averse parties avoid concluding such 
agreements. This article in providing an analytical perspective of the various approaches to 
the validity and enforceability of such agreements argues for regulation thereof in the 
UNCITRAL Working Group II’s proposed instrument on conciliation/mediation.  
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I. Introduction  
Although mediation1 has its roots in ancient history,2 it is only since the 1990s that it has 
sparked the interests of commercial parties, dispute resolution providers, policy makes, and 
judges as an alternative to costly and lengthy binding mechanism.3 The promotion of mediation 
as the preferred alternative to litigation and arbitration has resulted in dispute resolution 
providers and commercial parties to increasingly draft agreements containing MDR clauses4 
that call for mediation prior to other binding procedures.5 According to a 2011 survey of 
Fortune 1,000 companies conducted by Cornell University, 54.2% of mediations in corporate 
commercial disputes were triggered as a result of a contract.6 Moreover, a questionnaire 
conducted by Strong regarding the use and perception of international commercial mediation, 
resort to mediation in international commercial disputes is mostly attributable to AGTM.7  
Although increasing resort to mediation as a result of these agreements is noteworthy, there is 
significant uncertainty regarding the binding nature thereof.8 Such agreements have resulted in 
                                                            
1 Mediation is commonly defined as a voluntary process involving a third-party neutral (mediator) that facilitates 
the resolution of dispute(s) between parties. See also Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters (Mediation Directive), 
Article 3(b). 
2 Jerome Barret/Joseph Barrett, A History of Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Story of a Political, Social and 
Cultural Movement, San Francisco 2004, 69-70. 
3 See Richard Birke/Louise E. Teitz, US Mediation in the Twenty-First Century: The Path That Brought America 
to Uniform Laws and Mediation in Cyberspace, in Nadja Alexander (ed.), Global Trends in Mediation, Germany, 
2003, 365; Giuseppe De Palo/Romina Canessa, New Trends for ADR in the European Union, in Pablo Cortés 
(ed.), The New Regulatory Framework for Consumer Dispute Resolution, Oxford 2016, 414; Stephen R. 
Smerek/Bruce R. Braun/Andrew S. Jick, USA, in Michael Madden (ed.), Global Legal Insights - Litigation & 
Dispute Resolution, London, 2014, 289; Peter Klaus Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business: 
Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration, vol. 2, Alphen aan Den Rijn, 2015, 44; Kah C. Lye, A Persisting Aberration: 
The Movement to Enforce Agreements to Mediate, Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2008), 1. 
4 Multi-tiered dispute resolution, also known as “(multi-) step”, “ADR first” or “escalation” clauses, are used to 
refer to a dispute resolution agreement that contains multiple tiers of dispute resolution mechanisms, usually 
commencing with non-binding processes such as negotiation or mediation before calling for arbitration or 
litigation.  
5 See Oliver Krauss, The Enforceability of Escalation Clauses Providing for Negotiations in Good Faith under 
English Law, McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution, 2 (2016), 144; David Cairns, Mediating International 
Commercial Disputes: Differences in U.S. And European Approaches, Dispute Resolution Journal (2005), 64; 
Quek Anderson, A Coming of Age for Mediation in Singapore, Singapore Academy of Law Journal, 29 (2017), 
292; Drafting Step Clauses: An Empirical Look at Their Practicality and Legality, Pace Law School, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/IICL-NE.html (12 October 2017); Sai Ramani Garimella/Nizamuddin Ahmad 
Siddiqui, The Enforceability of Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses: Contemporary Judicial Opinion, IIUM 
Law Journal 24 (2016) 1, 166; Craig Tevendale/Hannah Ambrose/Vanessa Naish, Multi-Tier Dispute Resolution 
Clauses and Arbitration, Turkish Commercial Law Review 1 (2015) 1, 31; Marko Mear, Enforceability of 
Mediation in Multi-Tiered Clauses: The Croatian Perspective, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (2015), 1; Berger, supra 
note 3, 47; Lye, supra note 3, 1.  
6 Thomas J. Stipanowich/J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, 
Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 100 Corporations, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, (2014), 
34.  
7 S.I. Strong, Use and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation: A Preliminary Report 
on Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on International Commercial Mediation and 
Conciliation, University of Missouri School of Law, (2014), 16.  
8 See Didem Kayali, Enforceability of Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses, Journal of International 
Arbitration, 27 (2010) 6, 552; Horst Eidenmüeller/Helge Groserichter, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Private 
International Law, Social Science Research Network, (2015), 8; Anderson, supra note 5, 292; 
Tevendale/Ambrose/Naish, supra note 5, 31; Garimella/ Siddiqui, supra note 5, 160; Gary Born/Marija Šćekić, 
Pre-Arbitration Procedural Requirements: 'A Dismal Swamp', in David D. Caron et al. (eds.), Practising Virtue: 
Inside International Arbitration, Oxford Scholarship Online 2015, 227; Michael Pryles, Multi-Tiered Dispute 
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disputes about whether a party may ignore the AGTM and proceed directly to binding 
mechanism such as arbitration, the content of the parties’ obligations (whether the parties must 
be physical present, attempt to settle, act in good faith, etc.), as well as the forum that may 
address the enforceability question.9 Furthermore, the effect of AGTM on limitation periods, 
the validity the arbitral awards, and subsequent proceedings is unclear.10 However, it should 
come as no surprise that parties dispute the binding nature of their AGTM,11 as it is also 
common for parties to disagree regarding the interpretation and enforceability of their 
arbitration and forum selection clauses.12  
The increasing litigation regarding mediation emphasizes the need to clarify the enforceability 
of AGTM, as the current uncertainty compromises the benefits of mediation.13 However, unlike 
in the case of commercial arbitration, the law on commercial AGTM is in its formative stages.14 
There is no uniform statute and rarely any legislative basis that addresses the consequence of 
the failure to comply with an AGTM nor conditions for its binding nature.15 Accordingly, 
national laws must be consulted in order to address the question of enforceability of such 
agreements.16 Consequently, parties fearful of the issues associated with AGTM refrain from 
concluding such agreements.17 To demonstrate, in the EU, the growth of commercial mediation 
seems insignificant, as cross-border business mediation stands at a mere 0.05%.18 
This article in providing a comparative and new perspective of the current approaches to the 
validity and enforceability of commercial AGTM in selected states asks “should the 
enforcement of AGTM be regulated at the international level?” The time is ripe to ask this 
                                                            
Resolution Clauses, Journal of International Arbitration, 18 (2001) 2, 160; Lianne Sneddon/Amanda Lees, 
Frequently Asked Questions: Is My Tiered Dispute Resolution Clause Binding?, Ashurst, (2013), 1.  
9 Christian Bühring-Uhle/ Lars Kirchhoff/Gabriele Scherer, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, 
Alphen aan den Rijn, 2006, 229; Stipanowich, supra note 6, 5; Alexander Jollies, Consequences of Multi-Tier 
Arbitration Clauses: Issues of Enforcement, Arbitration, 72 (2006) 4, 329.  
10 Bühring-Uhle/Kirchhoff/Scherer, supra note 9, 230; White v Kampner, 641 A2d 1381 (Conn 1994), 1387: court 
invalidating arbitral award in light of a mandatory negotiation requirement.  
11 The term ‘agreements to mediate’ is not interpreted uniformly. While for some, this refers to the parties’ 
agreement to submit their current or future disputes to mediation, for others, it refers to the parties’ settlement 
agreement that arises from the mediation process. Furthermore, there are those that utilize this term to refer to the 
parties’ agreement with the mediator. In this paper, the term refers to the parties’ agreement to submit their current 
or future disputes to mediation. Such agreements are commonly categorized as contracts with both procedural and 
substantive effects. AGTM can be a clause in the parties’ commercial contract or be a standalone agreement.  
12 Gary B. Born, International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements: Drafting and Enforcing, 4th ed., 
Alphen aan den Rijn, 2013, 141.  
13 From 1999-2005, there was a 120% increase in the number of litigations regarding mediation issues (See James 
R. Coben/Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007, World Arbitration & Mediation Review 
1 (2007) 3, 398).  
14 Nadja Alexander, International and Comparative Mediation: Legal Perspectives, New York, 2009, 174.  
15 Cairns, supra note 5, 67; Maud Piers, Europe's Role in Alternative Dispute Resolution: Off to a Good Start?, 
Journal of Dispute Resolution, (2014) 2, 295; Eidenmüeller/ Groserichter, supra note 8, 8; Laurence Boulle, 
Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice, 3rd ed., Australia 2011, 617; Anne Bihancov, What Is an Example of a 
Good Dispute Resolution Clause and Why?, Australian Centre for Justice Innovation, (2014), 2.  
16 Piers, supra note 15, 295; Eidenmüeller/ Groserichter, supra note 8, 8; Boulle, supra note 15, 617.  
17 Judd Epstein, The Enforceability of ADR Clauses, in International Association of Law Schools Conference 
Law of International Business Transactions: A Global Perspective, Melbourne 2008, 1.  
18 Furthermore, 25% of business disputes are left unresolved (Vincent Tilman, Lessons Learnt from the 
Implementation of the EU Mediation Directive: The Business Perspective Note, European Parliament, 2011, 8; 
Carlos Esplugues (ed.), Civil and Commercial Mediation in Europe: Cross-Border Mediation, vol. 2, Cambridge 
2014, 492; Carlos Esplugues, General Report: New Developments in Civil and Commercial Mediation - Global 
Comparative Perspectives, in Carlos Esplugues/Louis Marquis (eds.), New Developments in Civil and 
Commercial Mediation: Global Comparative Perspectives, New York, 2015, 4.)  
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question as UNCITRAL WG II’s discussions regarding an Instrument on Enforcement of 
International Commercial Settlement Agreements Resulting from Conciliation19 exclude from 
their scope the parties’ AGTM.20 This article argues that the current exclusion will adversely 
affect the growth of mediation, as commercial parties are in essential need of certainty 
regarding the effect of their AGTM.  
To address the above research question, this article firstly provides a critical analysis of the 
current approaches in selected states21 to validity and enforceability in order to demonstrate 
high degree variance amongst the approaches. In addition, the first section addresses the 
potential of harmonized default rules that can aid the courts and tribunals in enforcing the 
parties’ AGTM. The second section, again using a comparative approach, assesses the manner 
in which such agreements are enforced transnationally by courts and arbitral tribunals. The 
second section following the chronological order of a dispute regarding the enforceability of 
an AGTM further addresses the enforcement framework that would be best suited for 
commercial parties. Accordingly, this section weights the effect of remedies ranging from 
damages, specific enforcement, and stays/dismissals. The third section of this paper attempts 
to prove the need to have a clear framework to enforce AGTM by considering the various 
arguments against and for enforcement thereof. The final section of this paper provides 
concluding remarks.  
II. Validity & Enforceability 
The validity requirements of the AGTM are not necessarily the same as the main contract nor 
the agreement to arbitrate. As is the case with arbitration clauses, AGTM should be viewed 
independently from the contract that contains them.22 Therefore, the validity of an AGTM s not 
affected by the invalidity of the main contract. Moreover, as mediation is a wholly different 
process than arbitration, the parties’ AGTM should not be assessed under the same conditions 
as the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.23 The doctrine of separability is supported on the basis of 
party autonomy, legal certainty, international comity, and the policy to give effect to dispute 
resolution clauses.24 In line with the principle of separability, this section discusses the validity 
and enforceability of AGTM without relying on the conditions relating to agreements to 
arbitrate.  
                                                            
19 Conciliation is used by the WG II as a synonym for mediation (A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.188, 2, Sixty-second session, 
New York, 2-6 February 2015). 
20 A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.202, Sixty-seventh session, Vienna, 2-6 October 2017, draft provision 1, 2. 
21 Austria, Australia, England & Wales, Germany, Singapore, the Netherlands, and the US.  
22 Esplugues 2014, supra note 18, 548 & 589; Esplugues 2015, supra note 18, 29; Ronán Feehily, The Contractual 
Certainty of Commercial Agreements to Mediate in Ireland, Irish Journal of Legal Studies, (2016), 64. Also see 
for Germany, BGH, XII ZR 165/06, Judgement of 29 October 2008, para. 27-28 (mediation clauses prevent court 
action) and the US case severing the AGTM from the rest of MDR clause to save the MDR: Templeton Dev. Corp. 
v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1073, 1084, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 27 (2006).  
23 Also see NSW Court of Appeals, United Group Rail Service Ltd v Rail Corporation New South Wales, 
Judgement of 3 July 2009, para. 89. 
24 Zheng Sophia Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in International Commercial Law, New York, 
2014, 74.  
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A. Formal & Substantive Validity  
A valid AGTM must be both formally and substantively valid. Formal validity relates to the 
external expression of the agreement.25 Unlike agreements to arbitrate, for an AGTM to be 
formally valid, there are –with the exception of Singapore26– no special requirements outside 
of the applicable contract law requirements. Thus, such agreements do not have be in writing 
or signed. This statement holds true despite the debate by some scholars regarding whether 
formal requirements applicable to arbitration clauses should apply by analogy to AGTM. The 
legitimacy of the inapplicability of formal requirements for arbitration clauses to AGTM relies 
on an overwhelming consensus.27 Despite the lack of special form requirements, the parties 
should record their AGTM in writing as proof of such an agreement. 
To avoid redundancy of contract law books, in discussing the substantive validity of AGTM, 
this article will not provide an overview of the basic contract law principles concerning consent, 
capacity fraud, and duress. The substantive validity of AGTM is a matter that can be affected 
by public policy and mandatory overriding rules, as the parties cannot escape these rules 
through contractual arrangements.28 The overriding mandatory rules and public policy of the 
place of mediation apply to the procedural, private, and substantive law aspects of the AGTM.29 
Hence, these mandatory rules apply regardless of a choice of law.30 Public policy affects 
agreements that involve matters that cannot be subject to party autonomy, such as public 
administration and contracts involving third parties.31  
Of relevance here is the fact that the parties may not contract out of their inalienable right of 
access to justice. Nevertheless, in Germany, amongst many other civil law jurisdictions, the 
question of whether an AGTM breaches the inalienable right (unverzichtbare Rechte) “to a fair 
hearing with an impartial judge in accordance with the rules of natural justice” is answered 
negatively.32 This answer comes in light of the view that such agreements are only a temporary 
waiver of the right to a fair hearing before a court or tribunal and not a permanent waiver of 
the right to access binding solutions.33 This is in line with the ruling of the ECJ in the Alassini34 
                                                            
25 This includes considerations such as whether the agreement has to be writing, signed, in a special font or colour, 
stapled or digital. Substantive (or material) validity concerns the legality of the content of the parties’ agreement, 
their capacity and consent to enter the agreement, public policy, and sufficient certainty. 
26 On 10 January 2017, Singapore passed the MA. The MA is a legislative framework for commercial mediation 
that are connected to Singapore. According to Article 4(3) of the MA 2017, for an AGTM to fall within the scope 
of the statue, it must be in writing. 
27 Peter Tochtermann, Mediation in Germany: The German Mediation Act - Alternative Dispute Resolution at the 
Crossroads, in Kalus Hopt/Felix Steffek (eds.), Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 
Oxford 2013, 549. See also Burkhard Hess/Nils Pelzer, Mediation in Germany: Finding the Right Balance 
between Regulation and Self-Regulation, in Carlos Esplugues/Louis Marquis (eds.), New Developments in Civil 
and Commercial Mediation: Global Comparative Perspectives, New York, 2015.  
28 Tang, supra note 24, 58.  
29 Frank Diedrich, International/Cross-Border Mediation within the EU - Place of Mediation, Qualifications of the 
Mediator and the Applicable Law, in Frank Diedrich (ed.), The Status Quo of Mediation in Europe and Overseas: 
Options for Countries in Transition, Hamburg 2014, 63.  
30 In the context of EU Member States, also see Regulation (EC) no. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), Article 3 & 4.  
31 Charles Jarrosson, Legal Issues Raised by ADR, in J.C. Goldsmith/Arnold Ingen-Housz/Gerald H. Pointon 
(eds.), ADR in Business: Practice and Issues across Countries and Cultures, The Netherlands 2011, 115.  
32 Alexander, supra note 14, 187. Also see Articles 19(4) and 20 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), 23 May 1949 regarding unverzichtbare Rechte. 
33 See BGH, VIII ZR 344/97, Judgement of 18 November 1998; OLG Rostock, 3 U 37/06, Judgement of 19 
September 2006 at II.  
34 ECJ, Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA, Judgement of 18 March 2010, Joined cases C-317/08 and 320/08.  
6 
 
case, where the Court acknowledged that the principle of a right to a fair trial may be subject 
to restrictions as long as these restrictions are proportionate and part of a legislate public 
interested aim of improving access to justice.35 Thus, the parties have the right to seek to resolve 
their dispute through an ADR mechanism.36  
Yet, if a contract unfairly prevents or delays a party from accessing courts, it can be invalidated 
on the basis of interfering with a parties’ access to justice.37 For instance, there are at specific 
rules regarding the validity of dispute resolution agreements when consumers are involved.38 
However, such requirements do not affect pure B2B agreements. Accordingly, in contracting, 
it is of outmost importance to ensure the counter party cannot be categorized as a consumer.  
A similar but more limited approach can be found in American courts under the doctrine of 
unconscionability. Unconscionability is one of the main grounds relied upon to deny 
enforcement.39 Again, the best example to demonstrate this exception does not derive from a 
commercial contract. In Garrett v Hooters-Toledo,40 the dispute involved a mediation clause 
that required the employee to request mediation within ten days of a claim arising. If the 
employee failed to bring the claim within this period, the clause indicated that this was a 
forfeiture of the claim.41 Moreover, the mediation would have to take place in a city other than 
the employee’s work place. Unsurprisingly, the court held that the clause was unconscionable, 
as the terms of the clause imposed “burdens and barriers that would routinely defer former 
employees from vindicating their rights.”42 Lastly, there have been instances of American 
courts refusing to enforce an AGTM calling for mediation contrary to states law.43 
1. The Need for Certainty & Completeness / Essentialia Negotii  
For an agreement to be binding on the parties and thereby enforceable, it must in addition to 
being formally valid and without obvious errors, be sufficiently certain and complete (in civil 
law jurisdictions: essentialia negotii). The contract law requirement of certainty and 
completion exists in many jurisdictions.44 Certainty is essential to the enforcement of the 
clause, as the clause is not self-executing, and thus, courts need a sufficiently objective criteria 
to assess parties’ compliance with their agreement. Regarding certainty, it is of the essence to 
note that research on ICC tribunals indicates that they do not follow the judicial trend to assess 
the enforceability of AGTM. Instead, applying a two-pronged approach, the tribunals firstly 
                                                            
35 Ibid, para. 68.  
36 Jarrosson, supra note 31, 115.  
37 Ibid, 114.  
38 See e.g. Article 3 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC Of 5 April 1993 On Unfair Terms In Consumer Contracts 
[1992] OJ L 95/29 and Article 10 of Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 
and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR). 
39 Lucy V. Katz, Getting to the table, Kicking and Screaming: Drafting an Enforceable Mediation Provision, 
Alternatives, 26 (2008), 185. 
40 Garrett v Hooters-Toledo 295 F Supp 2s 774 (ND Ohio 2003). .  
41 Jennifer Ralph, Unconscionable Mediation Clauses: Garret v Hooters-Toledo, Harvard Negotiation Law 
Review, 10 (2005) 383, 1. 
42 Garrett, supra note 40, 783. See also Alexander, supra note 14, 198. 
43 See Templeton Dev., supra note 22: refusal to enforce a construction contract requiring mediation in Nevada as 
the California Code of Civil Procedure 210.42(a) renders such provisions void and unenforceable.  
44 General principles of contract formation under the common law require the parties to a contract to demonstrate 
a clear intent to enter into a relation that is sufficiently certain in its terms (Bihancov, supra note 15, 2; Keith 
Han/Nicholas Poon, The Enforceability of Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreements: Emerging Problems and 
Issues, Singapore Academy of Law Journal, 25 (2013), 457).  
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tend to consider whether the parties had an obligation to attempt mediation prior to 
arbitration.45 Parties’ must use mandatory wording to demonstrate the obligatory nature of their 
AGTM.46 If so, the tribunals, applying a factual analysis, check if this obligation was fulfilled.47  
The paragraphs below provide an overview of the contrasting approaches to the enforceability 
of AGTM. In addressing the question of how courts apply the requirements of certainty and 
completeness to AGTM, this paper draws on a substantial body of case law from common law 
jurisdictions due to a lack thereof from civil law countries. The disparity in the number of cases 
between the common and civil law jurisdiction in focus is perhaps due to newness of 
commercial mediation in Germany and Austria.48  
In addition, statutes in Austria and Germany do not regulate AGTM. Therefore, such 
agreements are regulated by general contract law requirements and the contents of thereof are 
also left to party autonomy. For an AGTM to fulfil the conditions for certainty, it must express 
the will of the parties to be bound by their obligation to mediate. In German, this can be 
demonstrated through a pactum de non petendo.49 Alternatively, the parties can specify that the 
courts should dismiss causes brought in violation of their AGTM. In addition to expressing the 
will of the parties, an enforceable AGTM must define the types of dispute the parties intend to 
submit to mediation.50 However, it is not clear whether similar to common law jurisdictions, a 
specification of a procedure for the appointment of the neutral suffices in Germany or if the 
agreement must specify the mediator by name.51 In Austria, according to Frauenberger-Pfeiler, 
the certainty requirements implies that the agreement must contain details regarding the 
selection of the neutral(s).52 Nevertheless, it must be noted that in both jurisdictions the 
question of whether an AGTM is enforceable has not yet been explicitly decided.53  
                                                            
45 Wian Erlank, Enforcement of Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses, (2002), 42.  
46 ICC Case No. 4230: The tribunal found that it had jurisdiction in accordance with the non-obligatory wording 
of the clause: “all disputes related to the present contract may be settled amicably.” ICC Case No. 10256: The 
tribunal found that the wording of the clause indicated that mediation was not mandatory: “either party […] may 
refer the dispute to an expert for consideration of the dispute.” 
47 Erlank, supra note 45, 42.  
48 In Austria, the predominant form of dispute resolution is litigation in front of national courts (Peter G. 
Mayr/Nemeth Kristin, Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Austria: A Traditional Litigation Culture Slowly 
Embraces ADR, in Felix Steffek/Hannes Unberath (eds.), Regulating Dispute Resolution: ADR and Access to 
Justice at the Crossroads, Oxford 2013, 65). Likewise, litigation is the most common form of dispute resolution 
in Germany. Recourse to court is a deeply rooted tradition in German legal culture, as Germany has a traditionally 
strong court system (Burkhard Hess/Nils Pelzer, Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Germany: Cautious Steps 
Towards the Construction of an ADR System, in Felix Steffek/Hannes Unberath (eds.), Regulating Dispute 
Resolution: ADR and Access to Justice at the Crossroads, Oxford 2013, 212; Arthur Trossen, Practical Issues and 
Shortcomings of the New 2012 German Mediation Act, in Frank Diedrich (ed.), The Status Quo of Mediation in 
Europe and Overseas: Options for Countries in Transition, Hamburg 2014, 118; Iris Benöhr/Christopher Hodges/ 
Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Germany, in Christopher Hodges/Iris Benöhr/ Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda (eds.), 
Consumer ADR in Europe Civil Justice Systems, Oxford 2012, 73). 
49 The mutual agreement not to sue (‘dilatorischer Klageverzicht’) is a procedural law agreement that is 
understood as a temporary waiver of the parties’ inherent rich to go to court. Such an agreement does not affect 
the merits of the dispute (Peter Klaus Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business: Negotiation, 
Mediation, Arbitration, vol. 1, Alphen aan Den Rijn, 2015, 128). 
50  BGB §145 et seq. It should be noted that the conditions of defining the dispute subject to ADR is known as 
the bestimmtheitserfordernis and is highly relevant in ADR agreements where parties agree to resolve a future 
dispute via ADR. Also see Piers, supra note 15, 287; Tochtermann, supra note 27, 539. 
51  Piers, supra note 15, 288.  
52  Ibid.  
53 The BGH has held conciliation clauses that clearly demonstrate the intention of the parties to make litigation a 
last resort as enforceable (See Tochtermann, supra note 27, 538). 
8 
 
Regarding the common and civil law divide to certainty, there is a philosophical difference to 
note. As evident from above, in the Germanic systems, the courts are attached to the notion 
that the will of the parties should be adhered to in order to ensure reliance and only the absence 
of will to enter the contract should be a basis for avoidance.54 The common law approach to 
protecting reliance, however, solely focuses on the binding nature of the contract.55 Moreover, 
amongst the common law jurisdictions in focus, there is a tendency to apply differing certainty 
thresholds. It appears that at this stage, the Australian and Singaporean courts take a more 
liberal approach than English courts.56  
English courts have been criticized for their strict approach to sufficient certainty.57 For 
instance, in 2012, in Sulamerica,58 Moore-Bick LJ found the clause unenforceable while 
acknowledging that the parties clearly intended to be bound.59 Likewise, Hildyard J in Wah,60 
found the clause unenforceable despite it establishing a detailed procedure, as the process was 
not clear regarding who was to be involved, whether the neutral was to reach a conclusion or 
take a particular step, and as the clause contained vague terms such as ‘attempt to resolve the 
dispute’.61  
 
The approach in Sulamerica and Wah seems to act against the 2002 celebrated judgement in 
Cable & Wireless62 where Colman J of the Commercial Court found a clause enforceable 
despite the parties’ lack of choosing a particular method of dispute resolution.63 This strict 
approach remains despite the Emirate,64 where a MDR clauses requiring “friendly discussions” 
was found to be enforceable, as Teare J purposefully distinguished Sulamerica and Wah on the 
basis that these cases required mediation/conciliation while the latter required the resolution of 
the dispute through friendly discussion in good faith. However, it is possible that the reasoning 
of Teare J will indirectly affect the courts’ policy towards enforcing AGTM.65 This is because 
English courts’ main argument for their aversion to enforcement of AGTM has been their 
likeness to agreements to agree, which had prior to Emirates were found to be unenforceable.66 
Thus, it can be said that the position of English courts towards the enforceability of such 
                                                            
54 Hugh Beale, Characteristics of Contract Laws and the European Optional Instrument, in Horst Eidenmüeller 
(ed.), Regulator Competition in Contract Law and Dispute Resolution, Oxford 2013, 320.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Anderson, supra note 5, 292; Sneddon/ Lees, supra note 8, 2; Joel Lee, Mediation Clauses at the Crossroads, 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, (2001), 87; Han/Poon, supra note 44, 474.  
57 Neil Andrews, Andrews on Civil Processes: Arbitration and Mediation, vol. 2, Cambridge 2013, para. 1.52. 
58 ECA (Civil Division), Sulamerica CIA Nacionla De Seguros SA v Enesa Engenharia SA [2012] EWCA Civ 
638, Judgement of 16 May 2012.  
59 Ibid, para. 35-36. 
60 EHC (Chancery Division), Wah (Aka Alan Tang) & Anor v Grant Thornton International Ltd. and others, 
[2012] EWHC 3198 (Ch), [2012] CN 63, Judgement of 14 November 2012. 
61 Ibid, para. 27, for the dispute resolution clause and para. 63 & 82.  
62 EHC (Commercial Court) Division, Cable & Wireless Plc v IBM United Kingdom Ltd [2002] EWHC 2059 
(Comm Ct), [2002] CLC 1319, Judgement of 11 October 2002.  
63 Ibid at para. 25. 
64 EHC (Queen’s Bench Division), Emirate Trading Agency Llc v Prime Mineral Exports Private Ltd [2014] 
EWHC 014 (Comm), Judgement of 1 July 2014.  
65 See also Maryam Salehijam, Enforceability Of ADR Agreements: An Analysis Of Selected EU Member States, 
International Trade and Business Law Review, (forthcoming 2018).   
66 See Salehijam, supra note 65.  
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agreements is “evolving”, 67 while the approach to AGTM in Australia and Singapore can be 
summarized as enforcement friendly. 
Although the approach of Australian and Singapore correlates, with the passing of the 2017 
MA, Singapore appears to be a step ahead of Australia in its approach to AGTMs. Article 8 of 
the MA grants Singaporean courts the statutory power to order a stay of proceedings pending 
a mediation as long as the parties have expressed their intention to be bound in writing. 
Accordingly, the MA does not appear to require the agreement to address further details about 
the procedure of mediation or the provider. The pro-enforcement policy of Singapore is also 
evident in case law. In International Research Corp,68 Sundaresh Menon CJ on appeal agreed 
with the High Court that the precondition to arbitration was enforceable although the title of 
the clause called for mediation, but described the process of negotiations.69 Chan Seng Onn J 
of the High Court in relying on the mandatory character of the dispute resolution clause relied 
on the reasoning of Colman J in Cable & Wireless and did not make a reference to Sulamerica 
nor Wah.70 
Likewise, the Australian courts’ approach to dispute resolution clauses is to hold the parties to 
the terms of their agreement.71 These courts interpret such clauses in a liberal way and thus in 
the same manner as other clauses in a commercial contracts.72 According to Vickery J in the 
Australian case of WTE:73 
[A]s a minimum, what is necessary for a valid and enforceable dispute resolution 
clause, is to set out the process or model to be employed, and in a manner which does 
not leave this to further argument.74  
Yet, the requirement of certainty does not imply the dispute resolution clause must be overly 
structured.75  
                                                            
67 Krauss, supra note 5, 147.  
68 SCA, International Research Corp PLC v Lufthansa Systems Asia Pacific Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 55, Judgement 
of 18 October 2013.  
69 Ibid, para. 54 
70 HCS, International Research Corp PLC v Lufthansa Systems Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and another [2012] SGHC 
226, Judgement of 12 November 2012, para. 95. 
71 Andrew Murray, Enforcing the Modern Suite of Dispute Resolution Clauses, NSW Chapter event, (2015), 3. 
72 Ibid. In interpreting clauses in commercial clauses, the courts apply the following rules of interpretation: “Give 
the contract a business-like interpretation paying attention to the language used by the parties, the commercial 
circumstance which the document addresses, and the object which it is intended to secure” (Mccann v Switzeland 
Insurance Australia Limited [2000] HCA 65); “Only hold a clause void for uncertainty as a last resort, where it is 
not possible to give it a reasonable meaning” (Lord Denning MR in Greater London Council v Connolly [1970] 2 
QB 100). 
73 Victorian Supreme Court, WTE Co-Generation v RCR Energy Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 314, Judgement of 21 June 
2013. 
74 Ibid, para. 46. 
75 In Aiton, Einstein J noted that “if specificity beyond essential certainty were required, the dispute resolution 
procedure may be counter-productive as it may begin to look much like litigation itself.” However, the clause in 
this case fail, as it did not address the repayment of the mediator (Supreme Court of NSW, Aiton Australia Pty 
Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd, [1999] NSWSC 996, Judgement of 1 October 1999, para. 46 &174). Also see Mike 
Hales, Australia, in IBA Litigation Committee, Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses, 2015, 11.  
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a) The Good Faith Barrier 
In addition, the countries under analysis have differing approaches to whether a reference to a 
good faith obligation in the AGTM warrants its unenforceability.76 It seems that here the lack 
of consensus bypasses the common and civil law divide. English courts have been traditionally 
hostile to the doctrine of good faith.77 The reluctance to the recognition of the duty of good 
faith follows a main principle of contract formation in the common law.78 In Wah, Hildyard J 
ruled that the term good faith was “too open-ended” and therefore does not point to a 
sufficiently certain procedure that is to be followed by the parties during their negotiations.79 
Nevertheless, there appears to be trend towards recognizing the good faith obligation in dispute 
resolution clauses.80  
Again, the English approach is worthy of criticism, as good faith is an accepted obligation in 
other common law jurisdictions. In the US, the duty of good faith is recognized as a general 
principle of contract law that is implied in all commercial contracts.81 According to §205 of the 
American Restatement (Second) of Contracts, “every contract imposes upon each party a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”82 Moreover, in the 
Australian case of Aiton, Einstein J reflected on a commercial contract requiring the parties to 
negotiate in good faith and found that:  
It is clear that a tension may exist between negotiation from a position of self-interest and the 
maintenance of good faith in attempting to settle disputes. However, maintenance of good faith 
in a negotiating process is not inconsistent with having regard to self-interest.83  
Furthermore, Raja JA of the SCA clarified in the HSBC v Toshin84 case that it will enforce 
good faith negotiation clauses in cases where it is clear to the court that parties have not fulfilled 
or performed this obligation.85 Lastly, courts in pro-good faith civil law jurisdictions, such as 
Germany,86 imply the good faith obligation into contractual arrangements.87 Evidently, “self-
interest and good faith can co-exist.”88 
                                                            
76 “A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one’s duty or obligation, (3) 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent 
to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage” (Bryan A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., St. Paul 
1999, 701). 
77 Chris Parker/Gregg Rowan/Nich Pantlin, How Far Can You Act In Your Own Self-Interest?, Herbert Smith 
Freehills, (2016) 4, 3; Krauss, supra note 5, 148.  
78 John Cartwright, Contract Law: An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil Lawyer, 2nd ed., 
Oxford 2013, 61. 
79 Wah, para 57. 
80 Alexander, supra note 14, 196. 
81 See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, Harvard Law 
Review, 94 (1980), 371.  
82 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts § 205 (1981) [Restatement].  
83 Aiton, supra note 75, para 83. Also see United Group Rail, supra 23, para. 81.  
84 SCA, HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd (trustee of Starhill Global Real Estate Investment 
Trust) v. Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 738, Judgement of 27 August 2012.  
85 Ibid, para. 40. 
86 §242 BGB: “An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary 
practice into consideration.” 
87 Alexander, supra note 14, 196. Also see Han/Poon, supra note 44, 475.  
88 Lee, supra note 56, 98.  
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2. Ensuring Sufficient Certainty 
As evident from above, there is no uniform tests to determine whether an AGTM is binding on 
the parties.89 Courts approach enforceability in the majority of jurisdictions on a case-by-case 
basis.90 It seems that English courts are the most strict regarding contractual certainty 
principles, as a valid agreement almost has to refer to a dispute resolution centre to ensure 
certainty.91 Nevertheless, Alexander claims that the familiarization of common law courts with 
standard features of AGTM has led them to sway away from the formalistic approach.92 While 
it is true that Australian and Singaporean courts are more open to enforcing the parties’ 
intentions to mediate their dispute as long as the parties’ intentions are sufficiently certain, such 
a supportive stance remains to be seen in England. This is concerning, as it may “encourage an 
overly detailed and legalistic specification of process in mediation clauses and that this might 
have a negative and prescriptive flow-on effect for conduct of the mediation itself.”93 
Furthermore, there remains the reality that courts are likely to find an agreement to be 
unenforceable if it is missing minor details such as how the neutral is to be selected or 
remunerate. For instance, in the Australian case of Aiton, the mediation clause was found to be 
unenforceable as it failed to address the remuneration of the mediator.94 Erlank argues that the 
court’s refusal to order a stay on the basis of a missing mention of the mediator’s fees “seems 
to be a bit hard and not conducive to a just result.”95 He rightly bases this argument on the fact 
that there are other ways in which the fees to be paid could be determined, such as those used 
in cases involving arbitration.96 Furthermore, there are court sponsored mediation programs 
that may guide the courts in assessing the remuneration of the parties. In applying such a high 
threshold, the courts appear to act against the true intention of the parties in concluding 
agreements.  
Today, in absence of a uniform framework regulating the conditions for validity and 
enforceability of AGTM, it is important that the parties carefully draft their agreement in order 
to ensure its effectiveness. For an AGTM to be binding regardless of the jurisdictions seized, 
it must indicated the parties’ intention to be bound to the mediation by using mandatory 
language.97 In common law jurisdictions, the parties must also clarify that the binding nature 
of the agreement as a condition precedent to other binding mechanisms.98 Furthermore, it 
should address the following points:  
i. How to initiate procedure 
                                                            
89 Also see Han/Poon, supra note 44, 460.  
90 Born/ Šćekić, supra note 8, 239. 
91 See Sulamerica, Also see Han/Poon, supra note 44, 469; Andrews, supra note 57, 22; Thomas Heintzman, When 
Is a Mediation Agreement Enforceable?, Heintzman ADR, (2012), available at 
http://www.heintzmanadr.com/international-commercial-arbitration/when-is-a-mediation-agreement-
enforceable/ (13 October 2017). 
92 Alexander, supra note 14, 196 
93 Ibid.  
94 Aiton, supra note 75, para. 67. 
95 Erlank, supra note 45, 29.  
96 Ibid.  
97 The use of the word “shall” and “must” in dispute resolution clause indicates that the parties must first to seek 
mediation before arbitration (compulsory). 
98 See also ICC Case No. 9984: the wording of the clause indicated that the ADR is an obligation, the tribunals 
find the clause binding upon the parties. 
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ii. The scope of the agreement (disputes covered) 
iii. Applicable procedural and substantive law 
iv. Applicable institutional rules (attention must be made to the version agreed to) 
v. Description of the procedure 
vi. Procedure to select neutral(s) 
vii. Parties’ obligations 
a. Attendance obligations 
b. Behavioural obligations (cooperate, meaningful discussions, etc.) 
c. Temporal obligations (minimum number of sessions or hours) 
d. Etc. 
viii. How costs are to be divided/determined 
ix. Consequence for failure to comply (stay, dismissal, damages, sanctions, etc.) 
x. Place of mediation or method for selection thereof 
xi. Language of mediation or method for selection thereof  
xii. Procedure to terminate mechanism* 
*AGTM that refer to the rules and procedures established by ADR institutions often 
meet the underlined requirements.99 Nevertheless, parties should always make sure that 
the version of the mediation rules they are referring to are in fact covering aspects they 
have not included in their agreement.  
In reality, however, it runs contrary to practice to expect that dispute resolution clauses contain 
the above elements. Practitioners and scholars frequently refer to dispute resolution clauses as 
“midnight clauses” since they are often concluded so late in the day. In 2017 questionnaire 
regarding the perception of dispute resolution professional and experts to ADR agreements, 
65% indicated that such agreements are often copy and pasted.100 This is problematic, as it 
raises the chance of the agreement being poorly drafted. Therefore, there is a probability that 
an AGTM concluded hastily might not fulfil the enforceability criteria.101 This is especially 
evident in cases where the party requesting the enforcement of an AGTM is refused on the 
basis of an incomplete or uncertain clause. Unmistakably, there is a need for a new approach 
to these agreements that empowers the courts to fill the gaps in the parties’ agreements in order 
to interpret in favour of enforcement. This suggestion is in line with the modern approach to 
                                                            
99 See the reference to CEDR in Cable & Wireless, supra note 62, para. 21. 
100 Maryam Salehijam, ADR Clauses and International Perceptions: A preliminary Report”, Nederlands-Vlaams 
tijdschrift voor Mediation en conflictmanagement, (forthcoming 2017/8). 
101 Pryles, supra note 8, 160. 
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interpreting commercial contracts, which is to give meaning to the terms in order to preserve 
validity, as long as the parties’ agreement is formulate in mandatory terms.102 This is not to say 
the courts are to rewrite the contract for the parties.103 
 
III. Enforcement the Parties Obligation to Mediate 
There are two ways in which a party to a binding AGTM may violate its obligations.104 The 
party may passively violate this obligation by staying inactive once a party has requested or 
initiated mediation or it may actively violate this obligation by initiating litigation/arbitration 
contrary to the agreement.105 In international arbitration, the place of arbitration is generally 
accepted as the connecting factor for the national courts’ jurisdiction for supervision or 
assistance during the arbitral proceedings and awards.106 Similarly in international mediation, 
the place of mediation makes the rules of state most connected applicable via order public.107 
However, it is unclear who has the power to enforce the AGTM if the agreement forms part of 
an MDR clause calling for arbitration as a final step.  
A.  Legal Nature of Agreements to Mediate 
The confusion regarding who has the power to determine the remedy to enforce derives from 
the various legal natures denoted to these agreements. The approach of civil law jurisdictions 
to the legal nature of AGTM varies amongst states and is thus not as generalizable as the 
common law approach.108 While some scholars qualify the nature of the legal relationship of 
parties to an AGTM as a substantive one,109 common law courts find such agreements to be a 
                                                            
102 Verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis valeat quam pereat - the contract should be interpreted so that it is 
valid rather than effective. See also per Lord Wright in House of Lords, Hillas & Co v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 LT 
503, Judgement of 1932, para. 541: “business men often record the most important agreements in crude and 
summary fashion; modes of expression sufficient and clear to them in the course of their business may appear to 
those unfamiliar with the business far from complete or precise. It is accordingly the duty of the court to construe 
such documents fairly and broadly, without being too astute or subtle in finding” defect; Llongmore LJ in ECA, 
Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 121, Judgement of 15 July 2005, para. 
121: “[I]t would be a strong thing to declare unenforceable a clause into which the parties have deliberately to 
defeat the reasonable expectations of honest men”; Han/Poon, supra note 44, 460; Lye, supra note 3, 2.  
103 SCA, Master Marine AS v Labroy Offshore Ltd [2012] 3 SLR 125, Judgement of 18 April 2012, para. 41-42, 
per Rajah JA. 
104 Alexander R. Klett/Matthias Sonntag/Stephan Wilske, Intellectual Property Law in Germany, Beck Online, 
(2008) available at https://beck-
online.beck.de/?vpath=bibdata%2Fkomm%2FKleSonWilHdbIPLGer_1%2Fcont%2FKleSonWilHdbIPLGer.ht
m (12 October 2017).  
105 Ibid.  
106 Diedrich, supra note 29, 61; Filip De Ly, The Place of Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of International 
Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning, Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business, 12 (1992) 48, 76.  
107 Diedrich, supra note 29, 63.  
108 Jurisdictional qualification: EHC Emirate, supra note 64; Swiss Supreme Court, case no. 4A-124/2014, 
Judgement of 7 July 2014; France Cour de Cassation, 2e Ch. Civ, (Société Polyclinique des Fleurs v. Peyrin), 
Judgement of 6 July 2000; HCS, International Research Corp (2013), supra note 68. Qualification as a matter of 
admissibility: BGH, no. I ZB 1/15, Judgement of 9 August 2016 & no. I ZB 50/15, Judgements of 14 January 
2016; Swiss Federal Supreme Court, X. GmbH (précédemment V. GmbH) v. Y. Sàrl, lère Cour de droit civil, 
4A_46/2011, 29 ASA Bull. 6443, 651 et seq. (2011), Judgement of 16 May 2011. 
109 Eidenmüeller/Groserichter, supra note 8, 6.  
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condition precedent to binding mechanism and thus of a procedural nature.110 The 
categorization of obligations in ADR agreement as contractual relies on the argument that they 
are substantive in nature.111 On the other hand, others argue that as the object of an AGTM is 
to conduct a procedure, it could seem appropriate to apply the lex fori112 principle to regulate 
procedural matters.113 Furthermore, there are those such as Walter and Frauenberger-Pfeiler 
who classify the AGTM as having a hybrid nature, between procedural and substantive law.114  
In states where AGTM are viewed as having a procedural nature, courts have shown a tendency 
to enforce these agreements as a condition precedent to the arbitral tribunal taking jurisdiction. 
This approach may at first appear contrary to the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz 
(competence-competence).115 Both UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration116 and Arbitration 
Rules117 provide that arbitral tribunals may rule on their own jurisdiction. However, the 
determination of an arbitral tribunal regarding its own jurisdiction is not necessarily final: 
although an arbitral tribunal can rule on its own competence, a supervisory court has the 
inherent power to review and supervise the decision of the tribunal.118  
The level of control over tribunals varies depending on the jurisdiction in focus.119 In England, 
according to §31 and 32 of the Arbitration Act of 1996, the court can review the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction once the latter has determined it positively and upon the application of the party 
who has not taken steps in the arbitral proceedings.120 Furthermore, although the US Federal 
Arbitration Act121 does not address the principle of competence-competence, the traditional 
view is that it is up to the courts to determine the tribunal’s jurisdiction. 122 If the court finds a 
lack of jurisdiction, it can provide a negative declaration or an injunction in order to halt the 
arbitration. This is key, as an AGTM that makes mediation a precondition for arbitration affects 
the latter’s jurisdiction.  
Conversely, in Germany, the BGH held on two occasions that arbitral tribunals seated in 
Germany are entitled to assume jurisdiction regardless of whether the parties’ have complied 
                                                            
110 For the US see HIM Portland, LLC v Devito Builders, Inc., 317 F.3d 41, (1st Cir 2003), para. 44. For Singapore 
see International Research Corp (2012), supra note 70, para. 101. See also ICC Case No. 12379; ICC Case No. 
9812.  
111 As in Austria: OGH 9 ObA 88/11y, Judgement of 25 November 2011. Also see Eidenmüeller/Groserichter, 
supra note 8, 6.  
112 The law of the country of the court seized. 
113 Eidenmüeller/ Groserichter, supra note 8, 6; Bühring-Uhle/Kirchhoff/Scherer, supra note 9, 228.  
114 Ulrike Frauenberger-Pfeiler, Austria 2014, in Carlos Esplugues (ed.), Civil and Commercial Mediation in 
Europe: Cross-Border Mediation, Cambridge 2014, 12; Ulrike Frauenberger-Pfeiler, Austria 2013, in Carlos 
Esplugues/Jose Luis Iglesisas/ Guillermo Palao (eds.), Civil and Commercial Mediation in Europe: National 
Mediation Rules and Procedures, Cambridge 2013, 13.  
115 According to the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, the chosen forum has competence to determine its own 
jurisdiction. 
116 UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration 1958, Article 16(2)&(3). 
117 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2013, Article 23.  
118 In International Research Corp (2013), supra note 68, the court found the arbitral tribunal convened in violation 
of a dispute resolution clause lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. (See also Tang, supra note 24, 84)  
119 Tang, supra note 24, 84.  
120 Arbitration Act 1996 72(1) In EHC, Excalibur Ventures v Texas Keystone 2011 EWHC 1624 (Comm), 
Judgement of 28 June 2011, para. 64, Globster J held that s30 of the Arbitration ACT 1996 in permitting arbitral 
tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction, does not oblige such a determination to be made by the tribunal.  
121 Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (last amendment 15 November 1990), U.S.C. Title 9, sec 3. 
122 See e.g., Howsam v Dean Witter 537, US 79 (2002); PacifiCare Healthy Systems Inc v Book 538 US 401, 
(2003) 285 F 3d 971, 123 Ct 1531 (2003); Green Tree Financial Corp v Bazzle 123 S Ct 2402 (2003 
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with the preconditions in an MDR clause.123 An MDR clause that stipulates mediation as a 
precondition to arbitration does not require an arbitral tribunal to decline jurisdiction as such 
agreements have a substantive nature.124 Instead, the tribunal should dismiss the claim as 
‘currently unfounded’ (zur Zeit unbegründet).125 Nevertheless, according to §1032(2) German 
ZPO, prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, an application can be made to have the 
courts determine the admissibility of the proceedings. It is said that it can be beneficial to attain 
such rulings as the tribunal is provided with the comfort that the proceedings are admissible 
and that the arbitration will not result in an unenforceable decision due to admissibility.126  
The German approach to treat AGTM as a substantive issue does not conform to authorities 
that suggest that compliance with the tiers in MDR clauses are a matter of jurisdiction.127 Yet, 
there seems to be support for the German approach of treating AGTM as an admissibility issue 
from pro-arbitration scholars.128 According to Born and Šćekić, only if the parties make it 
unequivocally clear that they do not want the arbitrators to assess the compliance with pre-
arbitration procedural requirements, may AGTM be treated as have a jurisdictional affect.129 
The supporters of classifying AGTM as an admissibility issue rely on the presumption that the 
parties desire a centralized forum for the resolution of disputes that excludes courts.130 This 
argument does not take into account that parties willingly agree to MDR clauses calling for 
mediation as a condition precedent to arbitration. If the parties intend for the tribunal to make 
a final determination regarding whether their AGTM has been fulfilled, they may do so in their 
clause by inserting the following provision: “any dispute regarding the parties’ obligations 
under the AGTM must be determined by arbitration.”  
Furthermore, arbitral tribunals have shown a tendency to treat pre-conditions to arbitration as 
non-mandatory or have wrongly assessed the parties’ compliance with the binding nature of 
these agreements.131 In these cases, the party wishing to enforce a valid agreement faced delay 
and additional expenses, as they had to seek the stay of arbitration in national courts. Thus, if 
we leave it up to tribunals to assess the parties’ compliance without additional safeguards, we 
                                                            
123 BGH, no. I ZB 50/15 & no. I ZB 1/15, supra note 108: on the 9th of August 2016, the BGH confirmed its 
previous ruling that compliance with a tier in an MDR clause is not a question of jurisdiction, but of admissibility. 
124 Ibid, I ZB 50/15. The case was initiated by complaints on points of law (Rechtsbeschwerde) in accordance with 
§1040(3) sentence 1 of the ZPO following interim arbitral awards on jurisdiction. 
125 Ibid; Rupert Bellinghausen/Julia Grothaus, Escalation Clauses: No Longer a Tripping Hazard for Arbitrations 
with Seat in Germany?, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, (2016), available at 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/12/01/escalation-clauses-no-longer-a-tripping-hazard-for-arbitrations-
with-seat-in-germany/ (12 October 2017).  
126 Mathias Wittinghofer, Application to Have Arbitration Declared (in)Admissible – a German Torpedo to 
Arbitral Proceedings?, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, (2015), avaialble at 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/11/05/application-to-have-arbitration-declared-inadmissible-a-german-
torpedo-to-arbitral-proceedings/ (12 October 2017). 
127 Bellinghausen/Grothaus, supra note 125.  
128 See also Born and Ewelina Kajkowska, Enforceability of Multi-Step Dispute Resolution Clauses an Overview 
of Selected European Jurisdictions, in Loïc Cadiet/Burkhard Hess/Marta Requejo Isidro (eds.), Procedural Science 
at the Crossroads of Different Generations, Luxembourg, 2015. 
129 Born/ Šćekić, supra note 8, 259. See also Kajkowska, supra note 128, 172; Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Global Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution, (2005), 602.  
130 Born/ Šćekić, supra note 8, 259; Kajkowska, supra note 128, 173.  
131 See e.g. ICC Case No. 1140 Final Award 2010 XXXVII YB Commm Arb 32: an agreement to pursue ADR 
(other than arbitration) is a  ‘primary expression of intention’ and’ should not be applied to oblige the parties to 
engage in fruitless negotiations or to delay an orderly resolution of the disputes’; Emirate, supra note 64, where 
the party who sought to enforce the agreement faced delay and expenses as it had to argue for enforceability in 
front of the court in light of the tribunal finding that it had jurisdiction; International Research Corp (2013), supra 
note 68 where the tribunal wrongly held that the provision was too uncertain.  
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run the risk that pre-conditions to arbitration are never enforced.132 This would run contrary to 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.133 It should further be noted that arbitration is not a 
flawless process and parties who conclude an AGTM as a precondition to arbitration do so 
precisely because they want to make arbitration a last resort.134 It is, therefore, essential that 
courts can review the determination of arbitrators regarding AGTM.135 Lastly, to treat AGTM 
as simple pre-arbitral procedural requirements would minimize mediation as a dispute 
resolution mechanism and the parties’ choice.  
In light of the clash between the categorization of AGTMs as procedural or substantive in 
nature, it is perhaps more fitting to shift the discussion regarding the nature of such agreements 
from a classification one to one where the disputes arising from such agreements are key to 
determining how they should be treated. The disputes can fall under three basic themes: (1) 
whether there is a binding obligation to mediate; (2) whether there was sufficient effort to 
mediate; and (3) whether mediate would be futile. In light of this categorization, the question 
arise as to the most efficient remedy for such disputes. The paragraphs below discuss the 
various remedies employed to enforce AGTM. This chapter ends by considering the preferred 
and most plausible remedy to disputes involving an obligation to mediate.  
B. Current Approach to Enforcement 
The rise of mediation has resulted in courts becoming increasingly willing to enforce 
AGTM.136 The support for the enforcement is also reflected in Article 13 of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation137 and Article 10(2) of the ICC 
Mediation Rules.138 In most states, when courts are faced with a valid arbitration clause, they 
are bound by statute to decline jurisdiction and to give effect to the parties’ agreement.139 
Frauenberger-Pfeiler finds that “at least from a procedural point of view – mediation 
clause/contracts should be considered similar in their effects to arbitration clauses.”140 It is 
important to note that there is strong criticism of courts relying on arbitral statutes to enforce 
AGTM.141 In absence of reliance on statues on arbitration, there are three main ways in which 
                                                            
132 In case of pre-arbitral procedural requirements, various US courts have held that the arbitrator(s) have the final 
say regarding whether there requirements are fulfilled (See Dialysis Access Ctr, LLC v RMS Lifeline, Inc, 638 F3d 
367, 383 (1st Cir 2011); Howsam, supra note 122). 
133 An agreement must be kept (Lee, supra note 56, 93; further see section IV (B)). 
134 Berger, supra note 3, 47.  
135 This argument stands contrary to Kajkowska, supra note 128, 173. See also Pryles, supra note 8, 159. 
136 Alexander, supra note 14, 186. Also see Peter Tochtermann, Agreements to Negotiate in the Transnational 
Context - Issues of Contract Law and Effective Dispute Resolution, Uniform Law Review (2008), 710. 
137 If the parties have “expressly undertaken not to initiate during a specified period of time or until a specified 
event has occurred arbitral or judicial proceedings with respect to an existing or future disputes”, this agreement 
to conciliation (read mediation) shall be given effect to by the arbitral tribunal or court seized (UN Doc. A/58/17, 
Annex 1, 54, 58). 
138 ICC Mediation Rules 2014, available at https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/mediation/mediation-
rules/, (16 October 2017). 
139 Bühring-Uhle/Kirchhoff/Scherer, supra note 9, 230.  
140 Frauenberger-Pfeiler (2014), supra note 114, 12.  
141 There have been instances of American courts granting specific performance of mediation clauses by applying 
the FAA and UAA. In AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp at 460. See also United States v Bankers Ins. 
Co., 245 F. 3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2001), 460, the court equated non-binding ADR with arbitration in order to apply 
the FAA. Also see Amy Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual Analysis of ADR Agreements by Curing Bipolar 
Avoidance of Modern Common Law, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 9 (2008) 1, 19. 
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a breach of an AGTM may be remedied: monetary remedies, specific performance, and 
stays/dismissal.142 
1. Monetary Remedies 
Contractual damages tend to be compensatory in nature and aim to put the plaintiff back in the 
position it would have been if the parties’ agreement was complied with.143 In theory, a party 
could claim damages on the basis of a violation of a contractual duty to participate in a 
process.144 Such a claim, however, will likely fail, as it is difficult/impossible to find calculable 
costs.145 Damages might arise if the other party hired a mediator and rented a venue for the 
mediation.146 Even so, there are several instances of failed damages claims in the 
Netherlands.147  
Aside from contractual damages, courts in common law jurisdictions have at times 
contemplated the awarding of nominal damages.148 Nominal damages are minimal monetary 
damages awarded to a party who has not suffered any substantial injury or loss.149 They are 
resorted to by parties who can prove breach of contract but cannot prove damages.150 Although 
relating to a binding ADR mechanism, in 2007, Thomas J of the ECA in a case involving a 
breach of an expert determination clause in a commercial contract considered nominal 
damages.151 
 
                                                            
142 Also see Feehily, supra note 22, 98. Other potential remedies are not discussed in light of their rarity. Moreover, 
consequences such as vacating of arbitral awards are not discussed as they do not relate to remedies to a failure to 
comply with an AGTM.  
143 Alexander, supra note 14, 208.  
144 For instance in Austria, the breach of a mediation clause or an AGTM is a breach of a contract and is thus 
governed by general contract law, which can at times entail compensation (Frauenberger-Pfeiler (2013), supra 
note 114, 14; Esplugues 2014, supra note 18, 605). Moreover a breach of the AGTM can theoretically lead to a 
claim for compensation in accordance with the German contract law. In Germany this category of damages is 
referred to as frustrated expenditure (frustrierte Aufwendungen) (§ 280 & 241(2) BGB). For the Netherlands see 
Liane Schmiedel, Mediation in the Netherlands: Between State Promotion and Private Regulation, in Kalus 
Hopt/Felix Steffek (eds.), Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective, Oxford 2013, 731;  
The ECA in Sunrock Aircraft Corp Ltd. v. Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden, [2007] 
EWCA (Civ) 882, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 612 (Eng.), Judgement of 24 August 2007, indicated that a party could be 
entitled to damages calculated on the basis of the amount that would have resulted from the ADR process if the 
parties had complies with the dispute resolution clause. 
145 Piers, supra note 15, 299; Esplugues 2014, supra note 18, 606; Ivo Bach/Urs Peter Gruber, Germany, in Carlos 
Esplugues/Jose Luis Iglesisas/ Guillermo Palao (eds.), Civil and Commercial Mediation in Europe: National 
Mediation Rules and Procedures, Cambridge 2013, 166; Feehily, supra note 22, 101; Lye, supra note 3, 5.  
146 Hess/Pelzer, supra note 27, 296.  
147 Lower Regional Court of Haarlem (Rechtbank Haarlem), LJN AQ2615, Judgement of 4 June 2002; HR, NJ 
2006, no. 5, Judgement of 20 January 2006. See also Lower Regional Court of Zutphen (Rechtbank zutphen), LJN 
BH5413, Judgement of 24 February 2009. 
148 Kirby P in NSW court of appeal, Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v Sijehama Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 1, 
Judgement of 1991, para. 32, where he discussed the possibility of nominal damages. Also see N Voser, 
Enforcement of Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses by National Courts and Arbitral Tribunals: The Civil 
Law Approach, Durban: International Bar Association Conference, (2002). 
149 Nominal damages can be as low as $1. See Jeffrey Beatty/Susan Samuelson, Business Law and the Legal 
Environment, Standard Edition, 4th ed., Boston, 2006, 410. 
150 Coal Cliff, supra note 148, para. 32. 
151 Sunrock, supra note 144, para 42. 
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In addition, English and Singaporean courts resort to cost sanctions if a party unreasonably 
refuses to mediate prior to litigation.152 Likewise, in the American case of Frei,153 the court 
barred lawyer’s fees in line with the parties’ dispute resolution agreement.154 However, the 
“loser pays” rule has yet to be revered in Germany when the winning party has unreasonably 
refused to participate in mediation.155 Regarding tribunals, Bühring-Uhle etc. claim that “an 
arbitral tribunal is […] more likely than a court to enforce any financial penalties for rejection 
of the neutral’s proposal on the basis of fee-shift provisions.”156 Nonetheless, the argument 
remains that monetary remedies alone are not an adequate remedy to a breach of an AGTM, as 
they do not restore the lost opportunity to discuss the dispute with a trained neutral.157 
2. Specific Performance 
Specific performance is are a remedy that can be ordered by the courts to require the party 
violating their obligations in a dispute resolution clause to comply with their obligations.158 
Common law courts are traditionally reluctant to order specific performance of the duty to 
mediate.159 Specific performance is a remedy that is left to the common law judiciaries’ 
discretion and is traditionally only available when damages are inappropriate or inadequate.160 
For instance, the general rule in Australia is that equity will not order specific performance of 
a dispute resolution clause, as supervision of the performance is untenable.161 Moreover, some 
courts and commentators assume that mediation and other ADR agreements cannot be 
specifically enforced in light of the ouster and revocability doctrines.162 Nonetheless, Lee 
argues that “there is nothing objectionable in decreeing specific performance of an ADR 
clause.”163 Likewise, Alexander cannot comprehend why common law courts would refuse in 
principle to make orders for specific performance when “they are increasingly prepared to refer 
cases to mediation, even against the wishes of both parties.”164  
                                                            
152 ECA, Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] 1 WLR 3002, Judgement of 11 May 2004, para. 16: 
the ECA reversed the “loser pays” rules in light of the wining party’s refusal to comply with a court order to 
engage in ADR; ECA, PGF II SA v. OMFS Company Limited. 1 Ltd., [2013] EWCA (Civ) 1288, Judgement of 
23 October 2013; ECA, Thakkar v Patel [2017] EWCA Civ 117, Judgement of 25 January 2017. For Singapore 
see Rules of Court Order 59 Rule 5(c). Also see Joel Lee, Singapore, in Carlos Esplugues/Silvia Barona (eds.), 
Global Perspectives on ADR, Cambridge 2014, 415. 
153 Frei v. Davey (2004) 124 Cal. App. 4th 1506.  
154 Frei, supra note 153, para. 1508. Also see Templeton Dev., supra note 22, para. 22. 
155 Tochtermann, supra note 27, 521; Piers, supra note 15, 300. Article 105(4) ZPO on Family Matters enables 
judges to consider a party’s unreasonable refusal to attend an information session on mediation when making a 
decision on the costs of the court proceedings. 
156 Bühring-Uhle/Kirchhoff/Scherer, supra note 9, 240.  
157 Schmitz, supra note 141, 55. Also see Lye, supra note 3, 6.  
158 Feehily, supra note 22,100.  
159 Tochtermann, supra note 136, 711. 
160 However in the US, specific performance may be ordered whenever it is equitable (See the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 2012, §2-716 “Buyer’s Right to Specific Performance or Replevin) 
161 Aiton, supra note 75, para. 26: the court found that it cannot order specific performance of the clause in question 
due to the difficulty of supervision.  
162 See Schmitz, supra note 141, 26-27. 
163 Lee, supra note 56, 92.  
164 Alexander, supra note 14, 202. Cable & Wireless, supra note 62, para. 8: Colman J also noted that “clause 41.2 
includes a sufficiently define mutual obligation upon the parties both to go through the process of initiating a 
mediation, selecting a mediator and at least presenting that mediatory with its case and its documents and attending 
upon him. There can be no serious difficulty in determining whether a party has complied with such requirements.” 
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Accordingly, when a contract is drafted with sufficient certainty, it should be possible to 
enforce the agreement and supervise.165 These possibility seems to exist in Germany according 
to Eidenmüller and Koenig who argue that a party to an AGTM can request specific 
performance thereof and thereby oblige the non-compliant party to fulfil its obligations.166 In 
Austria, however, there is strong emphasis on the principle of voluntariness in a mediation.167 
Therefore, “parties to mediation clauses cannot prima facie enforce such contractual 
provisions, that is have a court order issued to the other party to require it to attend a mediation 
meeting.”168 Despite the disparities amongst states to the applicability of specific performance 
to AGTM, Schmitz claims that the real remedy to the breach thereof is specific performance.169  
3. Stays & Dismissals  
Common law courts and ICC arbitral tribunals are more willing to grant a stay of proceedings 
as a remedy for breach of an AGTM than specific performance.170 Singapore has gone as far 
as enacting legislation granting courts the statutory power to stay proceedings in light of an 
AGTM.171 If a party does not honour an AGTM it has voluntary entered into, the other party 
can request the court or tribunal seized to stay the proceedings until the defaulting party has 
complied with their agreement.172 The staying of proceedings is a way of indirectly enforcing 
an AGTM.173 In the Australian case of Banabelle, Einstein J in refusing specific performance 
stayed the proceedings on the basis that: 
The court may, however, effectively achieve enforcement of the clause by default, by ordering 
that proceedings commenced in respect of a dispute subject to the clause be stayed or adjourned 
until such time as the process referred to in the clause is completed.174  
                                                            
165 Erich Suter, The Progress from Void to Valid for Agreements to Mediate, Arbitration, 75 (2009), 35.  
166 Sabine Koenig, Germany, in Giuseppe De Palo/Mary B. Trevor (eds.), EU Mediation Law and Practice, Oxford 
2012, 141; Piers, supra note 15, 299.  
167 Markus Roth/David Gherdane, Mediation in Austria: The European Pioneer, in Kalus Hopt/Felix Steffek (eds.), 
Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective, Oxford 2013, 249. 
168 Nadja Alexander/Anna Howard/Dorcas Quek, UNCITRAL and the Enforceability of IMSAS: The Debate 
Heats Up, Kluwer Mediation Blog, (2016), available at 
http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/09/21/uncitral-and-the-enforceability-of-imsas-the-debate-
heats-up-part-2/ (12 October 2017). Also see Christoph Leon/Irina Rohracher, Austria, in Giuseppe De Palo/Mary 
B. Trevor (eds.), EU Mediation Law and Practice, Oxford 2012, 14.  
169 Schmitz, supra note 141, 92. Also see Lee, supra note 56, 92; Lye, supra note 3, 8.  
170 See also Santos where Douglas J of the Supreme Court of Queensland stayed the proceedings pending the 
performance of the parties’ obligations. In the US, courts regularly stay proceedings in order to indirectly enforce 
parties’ mediation clauses. (Supreme Court of Queensland, Santos Ltd v Flour Australia Pty Ltd [2016] QSC 129, 
Judgement of 30 May 2016, para. 28); ICC Case No. 6276; Coben/Thompson, supra note 13, 397. For tribunals 
see Mear, supra note 5.  
171 MA 2017, Article 8 (1)&(2). 
172 See for Australia: Aiton, supra note 75, para. 166; Hales, supra note 72, 13; Colin Loveday/Richard 
Abraham/David Brith, Australia, in Michael Madden (ed.), Global Legal Insights - Litigation & Dispute 
Resolution, London, 2014, 9. See for England: Neil Andrews, Mediation in England: Organic Growth and Stately 
Progress, Revista Eletrônica de Direito Processual, 9 (2012) 9, 581. See for US: James Coben/Peter Thompson, 
Disputing Irony: A systematic Look at Litigation About Mediation, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 11 (2006) 
43, 108.  
173 David Spencer/Michael Brogan, Mediation Law and Practice, Cambridge 2006, 410.  
174 NSW Supreme Court, New South Wales v Banabelle Electrical Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 178, Judgement of 22 
March 2002, para. 29. 
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Moreover, in the leading case of Cable & Wireless, Colman J relied on its discretionary power 
to grant a stay upon the court proceedings that could only be lifted when one of the parties 
could demonstrate the failure of mediation in front of the court.175  
In jurisdictions where the noncompliance with an AGTM is treated as a substantive issues, the 
most common remedy is a dismissal.176 Through a dismissal, a legal claim is dismissed instead 
of suspended; hence, the parties have to file the claim again if they mediation does not lead to 
a settlement.177 German courts have reject actions on the basis that they are 
‘temporarily/currently inadmissible’ in light of an agreement to conciliate on the application of 
the defendant.178 According to Berger, such an inadmissibility is based on the pactum de non 
petendo that is implied by the parties’ inclusion of an AGTM in their contract.179  
Although the question has yet to be finally decided, it is predicted that in line with the case law 
on conciliation, that in Austria, the potential for a dismissal is based on the prediction of an 
AGTM constitutes a temporary waiver to the right to start litigation and thus a claim brought 
in violation thereof is not yet actionable (mangelnde Klagbarkeit).180 However, it remains to 
be see if Austrian courts are open to enforcing AGTM in commercial contracts in light of 
Austria’s adherence to the voluntariness of mediation.181 As in common law jurisdictions, in 
Austria and Germany, a court can only dismiss a claim upon an objection by the defendant 
prior to the start of the hearing on the substantive of the dispute.182 Lastly, the request for 
dismissal will only be heard if the party makes the request in good faith. Accordingly, a party 
who has indicated their intention not comply with an AGTM cannot object to the initiation of 
legal proceedings by the other party on the basis of an unfilled obligation as under the 
agreement. 
C. Preferred Remedy 
Today, in absence of a harmonized approach to enforcement of AGTM, the applicable law 
determines what type of remedy is applicable to the violation of a contractual obligation.183 
                                                            
175 Also see Esplugues 2014, supra note 18, 607.  
176 As in Germany, in Austria, in accordance with the voluntary nature of mediation, mediation clauses and AGTM 
do not generally oust the justification of the courts (Esplugues 2014, supra note 18, 613; Roth/Gherdane, supra 
note 167, 249).  
177 Alexander, supra note 14, 204.  
178 *within the period of time set by the court (§ 282 (3) ZPO). Although German courts have yet to determine the 
remedy for breach of an AGTM, they have held in case of agreements to conciliation that when such agreements 
clearly reflect the intention of the parties to refer the dispute to litigation as a last resort, they will result in the 
court dismissing a claim as temporarily inadmissible (unzulässig) implied temporary waiver of action 
(dilatorischer Klageverzicht) (BGH, VIII ZR 344/97, Judgement of 18 November 1998; BGH, XII ZR 165/06, 
Judgement of 29 October 2008; Berger, supra note 50, 128; Austin Ronnie et al., International Mediation Guide, 
London, 2016, 41; Klett/Sonntag/Wilske, supra note 104; Stegan Rützel/Andrea Leufgen, Germany, in Michael 
Madden (ed.), Global Legal Insights - Litigation & Dispute Resolution, London, 2014, 123; Hess/Pelzer, supra 
note 48, 224). 
179 Berger, supra note 49, 128. See also BGB §133 & 157. 
180 See OGH, 8 ObA 2128/96s, Judgement of 17 April 1997; OGH, 1 Ob 300/00z, Judgement of 17 August 2001; 
OGH, 4 Ob 203/12z, Judgement of 15 January 2013.  
181 According to the OGH, mediation cannot be initiated and conducted if it is contrary to the will of one of the 
parties. (OGH, Ob 161/97a, Judgement of 15 July 1997 and the Austrian Mediation Act (Zivilrechts-Mediations-
Gesetz, BGBl I 2003/29) especially Article 1(1), 16(2) and 17(1)).  
182In Austria see ZPO §482(1); Mayr/Kristin, supra note 48, 78. In Germany, for a court to declare the claim in 
admissible on such basis, one of the parties must have raised the existence of the ADR agreement in limine litis, 
and thus prior to other exceptions or substantive claims (see ZPO §282(3)). 
183 Jarrosson, supra note 31, 120.  
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Hence parties who have preferences regarding the method of enforcement of their obligations 
should pay significant attention to the law applicable to the enforcement of their clause. 
Furthermore, sophisticated parties may provide their own contractual remedy in a penalty 
clause or include a provision for an agreed amount to be paid by way of liquidated damages.184 
The parties can also make a provision for the procedural consequences of the breach of their 
agreement.185 However, a provision with such a procedural effect is not always enforceable. 
The enforceability will depend on the lex fori. Evidently, it would be highly beneficial for stake 
holders in commercial dispute resolution if there was a harmonized approach to the 
enforcement of AGTM.  
It is important that whatever remedy is promoted as the preferred approach to dispute revolving 
around AGTM, that it complies with national rules. This consideration would rule out specific 
performance in light of the common law courts continued reluctance to utilize this remedy 
despite support thereof by some legal scholars,186 as well as the Austrian refusal to force parties 
to actively mediate. Section III(B)(1) further demonstrated the difficulty in assessing damages 
when faced with a non-compliant party as well as the insufficient nature of monetary remedies 
as they do not in effect enforce the parties’ agreement. Nevertheless, this article supports the 
use of damages or cost sanctions in conjunction to a stay or dismissal.  
The discussion hence turns to whether stays or dismissal are the preferred approach. Common 
law courts and ICC tribunals prefer staying proceedings, as a stay is more time and cost 
effective than a dismissal.187 This is because a stay enables the same tribunal that ordered the 
remedy to hear the case without the need to appoint a new tribunal.188 A dismissal would mean 
that the aggrieved party must pay a registration and administration fee anew in order to 
reconstitute the tribunal.189 According to Friedrich, instead of finding the claim to be 
inadmissible, the German courts should follow the approach of common law courts and order 
the staying of proceedings brought in breach of an AGTM.190  
Although courts in Germany and Austria have yet to resort to staying of proceedings to enforce 
AGTM, such a remedy is possible both systems. In Germany, a stay of proceedings could be 
made through the application of §251 and 278(4)&(5) ZPO.191 In Austria, in accordance with 
§168 ZPO the parties may agree to suspend proceedings. Such a procedural agreement can be 
concluded at the same time as the AGTM.192 Thus, the parties’ must opt for this option. The 
possibility to stay proceedings to enforce an AGTM was also envisaged in the Netherlands in 
the unsuccessful Bill (Wetsvoorstel) 33723 of 21 November 2012.193 
                                                            
184 Ibid, 120.  
185 Ibid, 121.  
186 See e.g. Schmitz, supra note 141. 
187 See also Halim v. Great Gatsby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2008); Mear, supra note 5; 
Bellinghausen/Grothaus, supra note 125.  
188 See Mear, supra note 5. 
189 Ibid; Garimella/ Siddiqui, supra note 5, 190. Moreover, stay and dismissals may have varying effects on 
limitation periods. 
190 Alexander, supra note 14, 206.  
191 ZPO § 278(5): courts may refer parties to mediation, conciliation and alternative dispute resolution generally. 
If the parties agree then ZPO §251 grants the courts the power to rest proceedings upon the application of the 
parties in circumstances where the outcome of mediation or similar processes would make this appropriate. 
192 Also see Alexander, supra note 14, 207.  
193 Proposed Article III, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2012–2013, 33 723, nr. 3, at p. 19. Available 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/wetsvoorstellen/detail?id=2013Z16937&dossier=33723 (16 October 
2017). 
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IV. Should We Mandate Enforcement? 
As evident from above, in jurisdictions where mediation is common practice, courts have 
shown a tendency to enforce valid AGTM on request of an aggravated party. The Netherlands 
is one of the jurisdictions that goes against this trend. Despite being a leader in mediation, in 
2006, the HR rejected the enforceability of AGTM by relying on the voluntary nature of 
mediation.194 This section by considering the dynamic relation of parties and their changing 
needs argues against the refusal to enforce AGTM and thereby calls for a harmonized approach. 
To demonstrate the need for a consistent approach to enforcement, this section address issues 
relating to access to justice, public policy, the voluntary nature of mediation, the futility of 
enforcement and the aim of commercial mediation. This section finishes by arguing for the 
inclusion of provisions regulating AGTM in the UNCITRAL proposed instrument on 
conciliation.  
A. Access to Justice  
When parties enter into an AGTM, they temporarily give up their fundamental right of access 
to a court.195 The principle of access to justice is enshrined in various constitutions, as well as 
international instruments, such as in Article 8 UDHR196 and Article 6 ECHR.197 As discussed 
in section II(B) regarding substantive validity, the EU and the ECJ accept such an exception to 
a fundamental right. In fact, the pro-mediation policy of the majority of states in the global 
north reflects the belief that mediation fosters access to justice and aids states in their pursuit 
of saving costs.198 The support for mediation comes from the consensus that in mediation, the 
parties maintain the right to terminate the process, and thus, the mechanism does not ouster the 
court’s jurisdiction nor interferes with the right to a trial.199 It simply imposes a short delay on 
the trial process.200  
B. Public Policy  
Policy considerations also favour the enforcement of AGTM.201 In line with their public policy, 
the national laws of many states do not accept the breaking of a contractual obligation simply 
because the obligation is to participate in an ADR procedure.202 In addition, according to the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, an agreement must be performed, otherwise the other party 
ought to have a remedy for the breach.203 Kayali further supports the enforcement of AGTM 
                                                            
194 In the family law context see HR, NJ 2006, 75, Judgement of 20 January 2006. This approach was reconfirmed 
in 2008 and 2009 (HR, RvdW 688, Judgement of 27 June 2008; HR, BH7132, Judgement of 8 May 2009) 
195 Piers, supra note 15, 279.  
196 Right to Effective Judiciary: “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals 
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.” 
197 Right to a Fair Trial: “[…] everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law […].” 
198 Silvia Barona/Carlos Esplugues, ADR Mechanisms and Their Incorporation into Global Justice in the Twenty-
First Century: Some Concepts and Trends, in Carlos Esplugues/Silvia Barona (eds.), Global Perspectives on ADR, 
Cambridge 2014, 6. 
199 Suter, supra note 165, 33; Jens M. Scherpe/Bevan Marten, Mediation in England and Wales: Regulation and 
Practice, in Kalus Hopt/Felix Steffek (eds.), Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 
Oxford 2013, 379. 
200 Sir Anthony Clarke M.R., The future of Civil Arbitration, Arbitration, 74 (2008), 419. 
201 Boulle, supra note 15, 637.  
202 Jarrosson, supra note 31, 119. Also see Petromec, supra note 102, 121: it is “a strong thing to declare 
unenforceable a clause into which the parties have deliberately and expressly entered.”  
203 Jarrosson, supra note 31, 119-120.  
23 
 
as such contracts reflect the choice of the parties.204 Likewise, in United Group, Allsop P noted 
that: 
The public policy in promoting efficient dispute resolution, especially commercial dispute 
resolution, requires that, where possible, real and enforceable content be given to clauses […] 
to encourage approaches by, and attitudes of, parties conducive to the resolution of disputes 
without expensive litigation, arbitral or curial.205  
Lastly, regarding Singapore, Loong and Koh argues that AGTM are enforced “as it is in the 
wider public interest to promote consensual resolution of disputes.”206  
C. Voluntary Nature of Mediation  
Despite the public policy in favour of enforcing a voluntarily agreed upon AGTM, there is a 
minority view that believes that the voluntary nature of mediation suggests that the parties 
should not be compelled to comply with their agreement. As abovementioned, in the 
Netherlands, despite support from some lower courts for the enforcement of AGTM through a 
dismissal of the case until the parties have at least commenced the mediation,207 settled case 
law finds such agreements to be unenforceable due to the voluntary nature of mediation. The 
Dutch approach appears to stand against the highly supported view that in enforcing an AGTM, 
the parties are not forced to cooperate and consent, but only to participate in a process that 
might result in co-operation and consent.208 As Tochetermann notes: 
[S]ome degree of coercion into mediation – to be distinguished from coercion in 
mediation – can have a healing effect and open the door to an amicable solution of the 
controversy. As the parties agreed in advance to give an amicable solution a chance by 
including a mediation clause into their contract, such “coercion” seems even less 
troublesome.209  
Furthermore, there is a growing trend for courts to order/mandate or strongly suggestion 
mediation,210 which raises the question of why the courts are not more willing to enforce 
AGTM.211 The experiences of the US, Canada, and Australia with mandatory ADR has shown 
                                                            
204 Kayali, supra note 8, 551.  
205 United Group, supra 23, para. 80. Also see Teare J’s reasoning in Emirates, supra note 64.  
206 Seng Onn Loong/Deborah Koh, Enforceability of Dispute Resolution Clauses in Singapore (2016), 17. Also 
see HSBC, supra note 84, para. 40, per VK Rajah JA: “we think that such “negotiate in good faith” clause are in 
the public interested as they promote the consensual disposition of any potential disputes.” 
207 In a decision in 2000, the Kantongerecht of Amsterdam found that mediation was equal to binding advice 
procedures and thus the claim brought in contravention of the agreement could not be litigated (Amsterdam 
District Court (Knatongerecht Amsterdam), NJkort 2001, 13, Judgement of 21 December 2000). However, the 
court was overruled by the Lower Regional Court of Amsterdam (Lower Regional Court of Amsterdam 
(Rechtbank Amsterdam), NJ 2003, no. 87, Judgement of 16 October 2002).  
208 Supreme Court of NSW, Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd v Natcon Group Pty Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR, 194, 
Judgement of 24 February 2002, p. 206 per Giles J. 
209 Tochtermann, supra note 136, 712.  
210 In the US and Australia mandatory reference to ADR is viewed as an improvement to access to justice, not an 
impediment to the right of access to courts (See e.g. Australia Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s53A 
and ss 53A(a), 1(A) as amended by Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Act 1997, USA Civil Justice Reform 
Act 1990 and ADR Act 1998). See also Arthur Marriott, Mandatory ADR and Access to Justice, in Julio Cesa 
Betancourt/Jason A. Crook (eds.), ADR, Arbitration, and Mediation: A Collection of Essays, Bloomington 2014, 
271.  
211 Suter, supra note 165, 28; Lee, supra note 56, 92.  
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that the level satisfaction with such mechanisms remains equal to ADR mechanism that have 
been commences as a result of a voluntary agreement.212  
D. Futility of Enforcement  
[I]n practice, any obligation to mediate cannot be realistically enforced. Usually there will 
be no difference between not participating in a proceeding at all and only attending a 
proceeding without the willingness to cooperate.213 
The last argument to the enforcement of AGTM relates to futility. Indeed, the parties’ 
willingness to participate in mediation is one of the most essential elements for the success 
thereof.214 Hence, if a party to an ADR procedure does not want to cooperate, the procedure is 
fruitless emphasizing the need to obtain relief from a court or tribunal.215 There is, however, a 
larger majority of scholars and judges that oppose the using of the futility argument against 
enforcement, as mediation often achieves results even in cases where the parties have been 
unwilling to settle.216  
Skilled mediators are now able to achieve results satisfactory to both parties in many 
cases which are quite beyond the power of lawyers and courts to achieve [...] it may 
very well be that the mediator is able to achieve a result by which the parties shake 
hands at the end and feel that they have gone away having settled the dispute on terms 
with which they are happy to live. A mediator may be able to provide solutions which 
are beyond the powers of the court to provide.217  
There is certainly proof that skilled mediators have the ability to sway unwilling parties to 
consider the opportunities of amicable dispute resolution.218 Even in disputes where settlement 
is not possible, mediation can assist the parties in narrowing down their disputes and/or an 
opportunity to assess strength and weakness of their claim.64  
Moreover, the reliance on futility to refuse the enforcement of AGTM ignores the fact that the 
parties concluded their agreement in the framework of party autonomy, a fundamental principle 
of contract law and international commercial dispute resolution.219 In agreement with Kayali, 
this article purports that if an AGTM reflects the parties’ intentions, it should be enforce 
regardless of the consensual feature of mediation.220 Therefore, the uncertainty regarding the 
potential for success should not prevent the enforcing of an AGTM.221 However, there is 
consensus that if the parties’ relationship hints that the Courts should not coerce parties’ to 
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comply with their AGTM if this will cause undue suffering or is unreasonable,222 or if a 
reference to mediation is clearly futile, a court’s refusal to grant a stay is justified.223  
E. Aim of Commercial Mediation  
In particular, the forcing of parties to comply with their valid AGTM is in line with the aim of 
ADR and the needs of commercial parties. Mediation is a means of avoiding lengthy, complex, 
and costly litigation/arbitration.224 Thereby, through enforcing an AGTM, the parties are 
provided with the opportunity to engage in a mechanism that may provide a durable and 
mutually acceptable resolution.225 According to Alexander, mediation can only become a true 
alternative to court proceedings “when it is subject to some degree of mandating.”226 In 
addition, enforcing clear AGTM ensures that the choice of the parties and the needs of 
international business community are fulfilled.227 It is commercially unfair to refuse to enforce 
agreements that commercial parties have voluntarily entered into if the intention of the parties 
is clear. Hence, the opinion of one party towards mediation without the consultation of the 
mediator should not sabotage the mechanism.228  
F. Regulating Enforcement  
The UNCITRAL WG II’s focus on an instrument on conciliation inexplicably excludes from 
its focus AGTM. This is despite Strong’s survey of experienced users of dispute resolution and 
experts indicating that 75% are in favour of a convention that addressed both the beginning and 
the end of the mediation process.229 The UNCITRAL choice is even more surprising in light of 
the finding that only 19% of the respondents preferred an instrument that solely addresses 
settlement agreements arising out of an international commercial mediation.230 Moreover, a 
study regarding case law in US indicated that the second most common dispute regarding 
mediation related to the parties’ duty to mediate.231 If the aim of the WG II in creating an 
international instrument on conciliation/mediation232 is to promote amicable dispute resolution, 
it must also address the initiation of the mediation. This paper, however, does not purport to 
support an international convention on mediation/conciliation, instead it that to create an 
instrument that does not address the parties’ AGTM would result in an incomplete instrument. 
As it is contrary to good law making to create an inefficient instrument, if we are to create an 
international instrument of harmonization for mediation, whether it be a convention or a model 
law, it should also:  
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i. Lay down minimum requirements for a valid and enforceable AGTM; 
ii. Set out the minimum rights and obligations of the parties to an AGTM;233  
iii. Stipulate when courts/arbitral tribunals are required to enforce the parties’ obligation 
to mediate;234  
iv. Recommend best practices as to potential remedies; and 
v. Clarify its relation to existing instruments in the field of dispute resolution.  
The above discussion regarding the various approaches to validity and enforceability as well 
as methods of enforcement can guide the drafters in creating an instrument that fulfils the 
parties’ needs.  
V. Conclusion  
Although commercial parties increasingly include AGTM in their commercial contracts with 
the aim of amicably and efficiently resolving their disputes, such agreements can have opposing 
affects. In absence of a harmonized approach to validity and enforceability, AGTM run the risk 
of extra costs and delays in cases where the parties have differing views as to the binding nature 
of their agreement or the fulfilment of the obligations therein. In demonstrating the national 
and cross-border uncertainty that parties face in attempting to enforce their AGTM, this article 
called for a harmonized approach to such agreements that is based on the most commercially 
desirable standards. In particular, emphasize was placed on the need to seriously reconsider the 
current content of UNCITRAL proposed instrument on conciliation. The time is ripe to relieve 
the parties of the current uncertainties and difficulties faced when seeking the enforcement of 
AGTM.  
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